In her new book, the Twilight of Democracy, Anne Applebaum attempts to explain the reasons behind the authoritarian wave that has swept over the Western world in the last decade. From Hungary to the United States, history seemed to take a sudden U-turn. Even in countries where democracy has not suffered serious blows, nationalists (and sometimes their mirror-images on the far left) have gained territory to an extent that was unimaginable ten years ago.
Applebaum is a renowned historian of the Soviet Union, but her new book is not a heavy tome. It's more like an essay of the length of a short book, in which she makes an attempt to explain how and why the zeitgeist has changed so much and so rapidly. She examines in detail how the events unfolded in Poland, Hungary, Spain, the UK, and the USA.
There is no real common theme that underlies the changes everywhere. There are some commonalities, but every country has had its own way in the race to the bottom. Poland and Hungary went straight down the rabbit hole. Both the Polish Law and Justice Party and Orban's Fidesz have invented imaginary enemies - migrants, Soros, Brussel -, and managed to keep their base in a constant frenzy of them. The USA and Spain have developed the twin forces of Right and Left-wing extremism that mutually fuel each other. Britain hasn't sunk that low (my way to put it, not Applebaum's), and it's an outlier in this story in many ways, but a bunch of nostalgia-driven zealots and opportunists has taken over the country.
The usual explanations for the general decline in support for centrist politics find the blame mostly in globalism and growing inequality. Applebaum barely mentions them and instead makes two observations. One is about democracy and the other is about the role a special cadre of the elite - she calls them 'clerks' - plays in the political turns and the maintenance of the new regimes.
Liberal democracy has two unappealing features, at least unappealing for a large number of the electorate, especially those who reached adulthood in one-party systems. One is complexity. After decades of socialism, the chaos of democracy with its constant debates, changes, and uncertainties were too much for many people. They needed a simpler narrative. And once someone offered the truth, why would we need pluralistic views? Secondly, liberal democracy is a meritocratic system. That is great for talented and lucky people, but it can be a source of resentment for others. For those, a one-party system where loyalty and not talent is rewarded is often much more desirable.
The other crucial element in these political movements is the existence of the clerks. The bureaucrats, intellectuals, journalists, and politicians who, for various reasons and rewards, decided to serve the regime. They spread the center's lies, explain away contradictions, stoke nativism, present a measured and civilized face to the outside world - while railing their base against it. In Eastern-Europe they largely came of age in the socialist era and the main reason to turn against liberalism was personal resentment. Many of them felt that in the new system they weren't given the status and recognition they deserved, but realized that they could have them in exchange for loyalty.
In England, the Brexiters subscribed to a special form of nostalgia. Being a middle-sized power in the shadow of the USA, China, and the EU is not a glamourous role for a country that ruled over a quarter of the Earth just a century ago. They long for a world where England could make the rules again, and shameless lying, sycophancy, and economical and political damage are a small price to pay for it.
What happened in the West in general, particularly in the US, is an unexpected break-up among former comrades-in-arms. A generation ago, the Soviet threat herded very different characters into the same camp. Christians opposed the Communists on the basis of their atheism and religious persecution. Nationalists hated the idea of Soviet dominance and the Marxist interpretation of history. People of realpolitik were concerned about Soviet influence and threat. Idealists thought that fighting for freedom and human rights is a duty. Free-market advocates hated collectivism. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the cohesive force disappeared with it and the differences become obvious. In the span of two decades, intellectuals drifted into two opposing camps, with no bridge between.
On one side are (or stayed) the believers of democracy and freedom. Not every one of them is an unabashed pro-market and free-trade supporter, but the latter all belong to this camp. On the other side are the ones to whom democracy turned out to be only secondary to something else. National greatness, or religion, or tradition. Many such people, even staunch Cold War warriors, have found an unlikely lodestar. - Russia, as the defender of tradition, religion, and conservative values. It looks like it doesn't matter how many journalists and human right lawyers Putin kills, politician opponents poisons, or war crimes he commits, or how much he and his cronies steal from his own people, simple claiming to be a defender of Christianity (and not even trying very hard at that) absolves all the sins. Applebaum is incredulous how people can fall for such an obvious lie, and so am I.
The book also addresses the role social media has played in the surge of populism. It doesn't make any novel observations but summarizes the topic neatly. First of all, social media offered the fringes a platform to coalesce. Conspiracy theorists, anti-semites, nazi-sympathizers, and general nutjobs used to have few venues to vent their anger. In the pub, on football-matches, or at family gatherings. The mainstream media slammed the door firmly in their faces. Now they can find and connect to each other as easily as never before. They can live in a social bubble sealed from alternative voices. Additionally, expressing some extreme opinions or insulting people used to come with the danger of retaliation. Anonymity on the net eliminates that.
Even for sane people, social media changed the perception of the world. The traditional ways of exerting political influence - voting, campaigning, international efforts - seem extremely slow and ineffective ways of bringing about change, and that frustrates people.
The world changed in another way, too, which is only partly related to technology, but like that, it's unlikely to go away soon. Apart from the mandatory anti-semitism, far-right parties across the world used to have little to agree on. Just being neighbors logically led to animosity. It has changed, very recently, probably as a backlash against the radical leftward-shift of the mainstream. From Russia to the United States, the right-wingers share a common fear and hatred for gay-rights, feminism, Muslims, immigrants, globalism, environmentalism, and technology (and still the Jews, which, of course, will never change). But they also share a vague ideal as well. The socially conservative, Christian family.
The book, unfortunately, doesn't offer solutions. Applebaum's farewell message is that these are darker days, and the liberal world order might turn out to be a mere blip in history, not the end of it. Let's hope and work against that.
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